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Abstract
Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs) based on parimutuel-type betting sys-
tems can aggregate information from complex environments. However, the performance
of previously studied systems leaves something to be desired due to possible bluffing,
strategic timing of decisions and a so called long shot bias. This paper demonstrates that
two modifications of parimutuel systems improve information aggregation performance
by removing disinformation due to strategic behavior and by removing misleading dise-
quilibrium behavior. The experiments also demonstrate that the so called long shot bias
results from disequilibrium behavior as opposed to having roots in the psychology of the
individuals.
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This paper1 explores improvements in the information aggregation capacity of a 
parimutuel based information aggregation mechanism first studied by Plott, Wit, and 
Yang (2003). The overall conclusion of Plott, Wit, and Yang (PWY) is that odds 
produced by the parimutuel system can be translated into probabilities that carry much of 
the information among agents.  That is, the bets placed by agents capture and aggregate 
information known to exist in individual participants even though the individuals have no 
particular incentive to reveal their information.  The focus of this paper is on changes in 
the institutional and incentive features of the mechanism that improve the process. 
 
That markets have the capacity to aggregate information was first discovered by Plott and 
Sunder (1982, 1988).  This discovery lead to the design and deployment of the first 
information aggregation mechanism created explicitly for the collection of diverse 
opinions found in field applications (Chen and Plott 2002, Plott 2000).  Those successes 
led to questions about the existence of completely different forms of information 
aggregation mechanisms and to the experimental work of PWY.  This paper is a natural 
continuation of a line of investigation of the institutions and designs that lead to the best 
performance. An additional body of literature has developed, typically under the heading 
of “prediction markets”.  While there is a clear relationship, that literature is not focused 
on information aggregation and will not be addressed here.  There are also IAMs that deal 
with much more complex interactions, specialized instruments and computerized 
reporting, a discussion of which would also remove the focus from the points addressed 
here that deal with parimutuel betting-type mechanism. 
 
While PWY concluded that the parimutuel process they studied did indeed result in 
aggregated information, they noticed clear deficiencies.  First, strategic, “last second” 
delays in the placing of bets tended to reduce the information to which the system was 
exposed.  Secondly, aspects of bluffing seem to interact with delays creating much 
disequilibrium behavior.  In addition, PWY observed a systematic bias in the information 
                                                 
1 The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.  
The comments of David Grether, Colin Camerer, and Robert Sherman have been very 
helpful. 
content of their data similar to features of data from betting processes.  Rare events are 
predicted with probabilities that are too high.  Similar patterns are frequently observed in 
horse races and other parimutuel betting systems and have become recognized as a “long 
shot bias” (see Thaler and Ziemba, 1988 for an introduction of the concept in the context 
of other betting systems).  From the point of view of information aggregation 
mechanisms and their design, the implications of the bias depend on the reason for its 
existence. 
 
Two different theories compete as explanations of the long shot bias as observed by 
PWY.  One rests on a conjectured psychological principle that individuals tend to “over-
weigh” events with small probabilities.  Thus, the psychological theory of the bias 
suggests the existence of fundamental limitations on the ability of any information 
aggregation device to gather the information that is located in the experiences of people.  
The theory suggests that because of human limitations the information to which 
individuals have been exposed cannot be retrieved, regardless of the mechanism.  If that 
is the case, then the design of information aggregation mechanisms faces important 
constraints.  
 
A second theory about the long shot bias is more optimistic about the prospects for the 
design of information aggregation mechanisms.  This second theory suggests that the 
long shot bias is a consequence of disequilibrium behavior.  In a parimutuel system, once 
a bet is placed it cannot be undone2. And, since fluctuation of odds during the betting 
process could cause almost any pattern of bets to be reasonable at one time or another, 
the nature of the long shot bias would simply be a consequence of the particular 
dynamics.   
 
Our attention thus shifts to disequilibrium choices and strategies that foster disequilibria.  
If the disequilibrium theory of the long shot bias is correct, then a step in the right 
direction would be to change the nature of the mechanism so the disequilibria are 
removed.  Two substantial sources of disequilibria suggest themselves immediately.  The 
first is strategic delay of choices, which follows from theory and is clearly demonstrated 
by PWY. By delaying actions and observing the actions of others before deciding, an 
agent not only learns from the decisions of others but also masks his/her own information 
that might benefit opponents.  The second source of disequilibria is a consequence of 
information aggregation itself.  A sequential updating is possible as information is passed 
back and forth, being updated at each iteration based upon the just received update.  If cut 
short, prior to approaching any asymptote the system will not have aggregated all of the 
information that exists to be aggregated.  
 
In this paper, two institutional changes are made to the PWY mechanism.  First, a cost of 
delay is imposed.  In a sense, a tax on waiting is established so those who place bets 
earlier receive a benefit for doing so.  The feature is implemented as the increasing price 
                                                 
2 There are parimutuel systems in which bets can be cancelled but cancellation involves 
inherent costs. See Camerer (1998).  
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of tickets to replace a fixed size bet and thus the term “increasing price parimutuel”.  The 
second is a simple replication of the exercise.  After all bets are made, the betting 
windows are closed and the odds are published but with no winner announced, a new 
round of betting begins with an independent “pot” for winners.  In this new round of 
betting, all information (except the winning strategy) emerging from the first round of 
betting is known.  Thus, the second round does not have the disequilibrium elements of 
the first round.  In a sense, it is much like the idea of a “tatonnement” invented to remove 
the theoretical problems of disequilibrium trades in markets. 
 
The basic result is that the cost of delay speeds the information aggregation process and 
improves the accuracy of the mechanism.  In addition, these institutional innovations 
successfully remove the long shot bias thereby suggesting that disequilibrium betting and 
not the psychology of the individuals is the cause of the bias. Information aggregation 
was further improved by the repeated round of betting. 
 
Structure of The Increasing-Price Parimutuel IAM 
 
Fundamentally, each subject was assigned the task of identifying the true state of the 
world, which was drawn from the set {A, B, C, D, E, F}.  Each subject was provided with 
three independent signals as to this state and then the agents were allowed to interact in a 
parimutuel market setting.  Their purchases in the market and the true state of the world 
then determined their earnings. 
 
A particular experiment consisted of a number of periods.  Each period contained four 
major phases: 
1.  Random selection of "true state" for the period (revealed only to experimenter). 
2.  Distribution of private information about the "true state" to each subject. 
3.  Markets open for purchases and then close two minutes later. In the repeated 
periods, the windows were opened again and a second betting began for a separate 
pot of money. 
4.  "True state" is publicly announced and earnings information is distributed. 
 
Institutional Framework of the Parimutuel IAM 
 
Much of the institutional structure employed here is based on the work of Plott, Wit, and 
Yang (2003), who considered a parimutuel mechanism based loosely on racetrack betting 
systems.  For ease of communication, we will refer to such processes as “markets” even 
though there is little market activity other than ticket sales. In the experiments, each 
subject was provided with a quantity of experimental money ("francs", converted to U. S. 
dollars at the end of the experiment) that could be used to purchase "tickets" 
corresponding to the six possible states.  The experimenter would sell these tickets from 
the opening of the market until a designated closing time. 
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After the market closed, earnings would be calculated based on individual ticket 
purchases and the "true state" in the following manner.  First, the winnings for each "true 
state" ticket would be calculated: 
 Per Ticket Winnings =  
Total Revenue from Ticket Sales
plus House Bonus
Total Number of Winning Tickets
 
Then an individual earns: 
 
Number of Winning Tickets ∗ Per Ticket Winnings
+ Unspent Experimental Money -  Loan
 
As a period progressed, the total tickets sold and "Per Ticket Winnings" (conditional on 
the market ending instantly and the given state winning) were reported publicly for each 
state. 
 
The increasing-price parimutuel mechanisms studied here have two prominent additional 
features. First, the closing time was fixed. Secondly, the ticket prices increased while the 
market was open. In particular, the market was open for two minutes and the ticket price 
would increase at a rate of one franc per second from an initial 90 francs per ticket.  The 
time remaining before closing and the current price was reported publicly at all times.  
This feature justifies the use of the term "increasing-price parimutuel markets". 
 
The second feature was the repeating of a period, which was developed to remove some 
of the disequilibrium elements and thus test the long shot bias against the disequilibrium 
hypothesis.  Some periods were (public) repeats of the previous period with the exact 
same true state and private information.  The earnings and true state of the first period 
could not be revealed until after both periods were completed.  These periods will 
generally be referred to as "repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets".  To the extent 
that the first period reflected equilibration the second period reflected no equilibration 
and if the long shot bias was due to disequilibria as opposed to the psychology of the 
individuals, then the long shot bias should not be observed in the repeated increasing-
price parimutuels. 
 
This leads to the rounds in the described experiments being classified into three separate 
categories: 
• "Non-Repeat" Rounds – a new true state and new private information are 
generated before these rounds and earnings information is reported immediately 
after the round. 
• "First of a Repeat Pair" Rounds – a new true state and new private information are 
generated before these rounds, but earnings information is not immediately 
reported after the round. 
• "Second of a Repeat Pair" Rounds – the same private information is re-issued and 
earnings for both this round and the previous round are reported immediately after 
the round. 
 
Much of the structure of these experiments is adapted from Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) 
and the major differences should be emphasized.  The PWY mechanism utilized a 
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random closing time while the mechanism studied here used a fixed closing time.  PWY 
used a constant ticket price as opposed to the increasing ticket price used here.  PWY had 
no repeated periods by contrast to the experiments reported here, so each period of the 
PWY involved its own equilibration process. 
 
Information Structure 
The most direct connection is that the information structure used in these experiments 
exactly matches the second treatment of Plott, Wit, and Yang (their Probabilistic 
Information Condition, "PIC").   
 
Each period would start with a computer selecting one of the six possible states from an 
equiprobable distribution (1/6 probability for each state).  This selection would be 
indicated to the experimenter and would be used as the "true state" for that period. 
 
The period would continue with the computer generating three independent signals of the 
state for each subject.  These signals correspond directly to the possible states of the 
world and are drawn from {A, B, C, D, E, F}.  The signals were generated with a 1/3 
probability of receiving a correct signal (signal matches true state) and a 2/15 probability 
for each incorrect signal (signal is different from the true state).  If the true state were A, 
then it would be as if the signals were drawn independently (with replacement) from an 
urn containing fifteen balls labeled as follows: 
A A A A A  B B  C C  D D  E E  F F 
 
Occasionally these private signals will be grouped into "Information Types", referring to 
the number of matching signals that a subject received.  A subject at "InfoType 3" 
received three matching signals (e.g. AAA or BBB,etc.).  A subject at "InfoType 2" 
received exactly two matching signals (e.g., AAB).  A subject at "InfoType 1" received 
three different signals (e.g., ABC). 
 
Since each subject receives three independent draws, their private information has a 
multinomial distribution with six possible outcomes and three trials with the probabilities 
identified above.  This distribution has the following joint probability mass function:  
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Bayes' Law can then be used in the standard way to identify the posterior probability 
distribution over the states given the private signal. 
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These posterior probabilities can be easily summarized in a simple table: 
Posterior probability distribution across states given private information 
 most 
frequent 
letter (A) 
second most 
frequent 
letter (B) 
third most 
frequent 
letter (C) 
each of the 
other letters 
(D, E, F) 
all three draws are the 
same letter (AAA) 
75.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
two of the three draws are 
the same letter (AAB) 
49.0% 19.6% 7.8% 7.8% 
all three draws are different 
letters (ABC) 
23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 9.5% 
 
 
Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
Experiment parameters are as follows: 
Parameters 010215 010222 010315 010419 010426 2100 
010426 
2230 010510 
Subjects 18 10 9 10 10 10 19 
Endowment 9000 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 
Loan 13500 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700 
House Bonus 45000 9000 9000 9000 9000 9000 9000 
Practice 
Round #s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-Repeat 
Round #s 1-4 1-4 
1-4 
17-20 
1-4 
17-20 
1-4 
17-20 
1-4 
17-20 
1-4 
17-20 
Repeat 
Round #s 5-16 5-16 5-16 5-16 5-16 5-16 5-16 
Own Money 
Round #s 17-20 17-20 None None None None None 
Exchange 
Rate francs/$ 4500 900 900 1800 1800 1800 1800 
 
Each round lasted two minutes; and during a round ticket prices increased from 90 francs 
to 210 francs at a rate of 1 franc per second. 
 
The "Own Money" rounds allowed the subjects to gamble their previous winnings with 
no further endowment or loan.  These were excluded from all analysis presented here.  
Also excluded from analysis were the practice rounds.  For the analysis in this paper, five 
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tickets in the 010215 experiment were treated as equal to one ticket in any other 
experiment. 
 
Subjects and Recruiting 
The subjects were Caltech undergraduates, and for the last five experiments.  Although 
they generally did not have experience with this particular experiment (or, presumably, 
the Plott, Wit, and Yang experiments performed in 1995), they generally did have 
previous experience as subjects in the laboratory.3
 
Instructions and Training 
Subjects were given written instructions (which are available from the authors).  These 
instructions were read to the subjects with the aid of some presentations on a whiteboard 
– items such as a drawing of an urn with states in it, the posterior probability table 
included above, and the earnings calculation formulae.  After the instructions were read 
and questions were answered a practice round was opened for the subjects.  This round 
was identical to later (non-repeat) rounds, except that no real money was involved.  This 
round allowed subjects to familiarize themselves with the software used and the 
calculations required for the remaining rounds. 
 
Technology 
A purpose-built piece of software was used for all communication and transactions 
during the experiment.  The software was used to generate the true state and private 
information (on the experimenter's interface); distribute the private information to 
subjects (through each of their screens); receive orders from subjects while the market is 
open; report (with each transaction by any subject) the current time in the round, the 
current ticket price, personal francs remaining, personal holdings of tickets, aggregate 
holdings of tickets (by state), and current per ticket winnings (by state); and provide a 
report of current round and total earnings after each round.  This software was 
extensively tested before any experiments were performed and practice experiments were 
also used to ensure that everything would work smoothly. 
 
Measurement  
The results presented in the next section here are based on three important concepts: the 
Observed Odds of each state in the parimutuel mechanism and the Objective Winning 
Probability of each state.  The background measure of perfection in aggregation is 
captured by the Aggregate Information Available. 
 
Aggregate Information Available (AIA) Model 
The AIA model represents complete information aggregation.  The AIA model uses all 
private information (three signals for each subject) and then uses Bayes' Law to predict 
                                                 
3 Experiment 010315 had one subject from the 010222 experiment.  Experiment 010419 
had one subject from 010222.  Experiment 010426-2230 had one subject from 010419.  
Experiment 010510 had three repeat subjects (one from each of 010419, 010426-2100, 
and 010426-2230). 
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the state.  Achieving this measure of aggregation requires that mechanism reveal all 
private information. 
 
Observed Odds of a State 
The Observed Odds of a state is the fraction of tickets sold that corresponds to that state.  
Assuming that subjects act to maximize expected return, they will purchase tickets so that 
( )
sfor  purchased  Tickets
s allfor  on tickets Spending TotalProb ×s  is constant across all states (in which they 
make purchases).  This implies that the distribution of tickets reflects the probabilities 
predicted in a market of expected-return-maximizing subjects.  These are the "implicit 
prices". The Observed Odds of a state in the mechanism are an outside observer's best 
estimate of the probability that a state is winning, based on publicly available market 
information.   
 
Objective Winning Probabilities of a State 
The Objective Winning Probability of a state given the state’s Observed-Odds rank is the 
observed frequency that the state is actually a winning state when it has that odds rank. 4 
For example, of the 132 periods observed in this study, the highest-odds state was the 
winning state 91 times, for an Objective Winning Probability of 69%.  The exact formula 
is: 
OWP(k) = Freq WinningRank = k[ ]= # Winning states with rank k( )# Rounds( )  
 
The analysis that follows will compare these Objective Winning Probabilities to several 
similar benchmarks based on private information.  The first considers all private signals, 
representing the best possible prediction of the true state.  The others consider the 
problem faced by an individual subject – what can they derive from their individual 
private signals alone. 
• OWP of AIA:  OWP that ranks states based on the aggregate number of private 
signals.  This Aggregate Information Available measure will generally not be 
knowable outside of an experimental setting, representing an unobtainable ideal 
prediction relying on complete revelation of all private information. 
                                                 
4 The OWP will be calculated separately for four groups of rounds: 
• Non-repeated rounds (rounds 1-4 and 17-20 in these experiments). 
• 1st round of a repeat pair (odd-numbered rounds 5-16 in these experiments). 
• 2nd round of a repeat pair (even-numbered rounds 5-16 in these experiments). 
• PWY non-increasing rounds (column 3 of Table 4 in Plott, Wit, and Yang, 2003). 
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• OWP of InfoType3:  OWP that ranks states based on the signals of subjects who 
receive three matching signals.  
OWP(1) = # Subjects who receive 3 matching signals for the winnng state( )
# Subjects with 3 matching signals of any type( )
OWP(k) = 1
5
× # Subjects who receive 3 matching losing signals( )
# Subjects with 3 matching signals( )
k = 2,3,4,5,6
 
• OWP of InfoType2:  OWP that ranks states based on the signals of subjects who 
receive exactly two matching signals.  
OWP(1) = # Subjects who receive 2 matching signals for the winning state( )
# Subjects with 2 matching signals of any type( )
OWP(2) =
# Subjects who receive 2 matching signals for losing statesand 1 non - matching winning signal
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
# Subjects with 2 matching signals for any state( )
OWP(k) = 1
4
×
# Subjects who receive 2 matching signals for losing statesand 1 non - matching losing signal
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
# Subjects with 2 matching signals of any type( )
k = 3,4,5,6
 
• OWP of InfoType1:  OWP that ranks states based on the signals of subjects who 
receive three different signals.  
OWP(k) = 1
3
×
# Subjects who receive 1 winning signaland 2 different losing signals
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
# Subjects with 3 diffferent signals( )
k =1,2,3
OWP(k) = 1
3
× # Subjects who receive 3 different losing signals( )
# Subjects with 3 different signals( )
k = 4,5,6
 
 
 
Results 
 
This section contains six results. The first three address the existence of information 
aggregation in relation to the institutional features of the mechanism.  The fourth and 
fifth results focus on the anatomy of the relationship between disequilibrium and the long 
shot bias and the final result is focused on the combination of increasing prices and 
repeating the application of the mechanism. 
 
RESULT 1. Information aggregation is occurring in the non-repeated increasing-
price parimutuel market. 
The non-repeated increasing-price parimutuel market predicts winning states more 
accurately than 96% of subjects could with their private information alone. In order to see 
this note in Figure 1, that the state ranked most likely by the IAM market odds 
(probabilities) wins about 71% of the time.  By contrast the state ranked most likely by 
those that received two identical signals (the Type 2) actually wins about 51% of the 
time.  Thus, the market is clearly more accurate than the Type 2 individuals when 
 8
predictions are restricted to the prediction of only one state.  The predictions of Type 1 
individuals are less accurate.  In particular, any of the specific states of the three that are 
ranked most likely by the Type 1 individuals, occurs with 25% probability.  Thus, the 
odds produced by the IAM markets are more accurate than any of the Type 1 individuals. 
Since the Type 2 and Type 1 individuals constitute 96% of the subjects, the IAM market 
is more accurate than 96% of the subjects.   
 
Not only is the IAM more accurate than the Type 2 and Type 1 individuals when 
predictions are restricted to one state, the IAM market is more accurate when predictions 
can be expanded to include more than one state. As can be deduced from the cumulative 
frequencies shown in Figure 1, the state ranked second most likely by the market odds 
wins about 21% of the time (92% minus 71%) and the state ranked third most likely by 
the market odds wins about 6%, etc.  By contrast the state ranked second by Type 2 
individuals wins about 16% of the time and the state ranked third by Type 2 individuals 
wins about 8%.  Notice that the accuracy of the market is better than the Type 2 
individuals when predicting the winner as one in a set of three.  A similar observation 
holds for the Type 1 individuals and also holds for the prediction as one of a set of any 
size less than the universal set of six.  
 
Computations from the data demonstrate that for Non-Repeated rounds the OWP of the 
market dominates the OWP of InfoType1 and InfoType2, in the sense of First Order 
Stochastic Dominance.5  This dominance is statistically significant. For ranks 1 thru 4 the 
market is better (p<1%) as it is for rank 5 (p<5%).  
 
The analysis above is restricted to Type 1 and Type 2 where the market is clearly a better 
predictor, i.e. 96% of the subjects.  In fact, the market performs about as well as the Type 
3 in the Non-repeated rounds. Indeed, if the predictions are expanded to include three or 
more states then the IAM market is more accurate than Type 3, the best informed 
individuals.  
 
Information aggregation clearly exists in the sense that an outside observer can predict 
better than the best informed of the individuals with private information. This property is 
illustrated a more detailed look at Figure 1.  Shown there in the heavy line is the observed 
frequency with which the state ranked kth by the observed odds emerges as the winner. 
The state ranked first according to observed odds tends to win about 71% of the time and 
the state ranked second wins about 21%, so the one of the first or second ranked states 
wins about 92% of the time.  The top line is the OWP of the AIA, which represents the 
actual collection of all information held by individuals.  The state ranked first by AIA is 
the winner about 98% of the time.  This difference with the actual frequencies reveals 
that the information aggregation in the Non Repeat rounds is not perfect.  However, 
comparisons with the various information types reveal how good the aggregation is 
relative to the most informed.  We see the first ranked state by Type 3 occurring with 
                                                 
5 For Info Type i (i = 1,2) and for each rank k, Observed Freq[Winning | Rank according 
to Odds less than or equal to k] is larger than Freq[Winning | Rank according to InfoType 
i is less than or equal to k]. 
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about 90% of the time, which is more than the 71% of the market but not statistically 
significantly so.  However, when considering the top two ranked states the market and the 
Type 3 have about equal accuracy (Type 3 is 92.4% and the market is 91.7%).  AIA is a 
significantly better predictor of winners than observed odds (p<1% for rank 1).6  Except 
for those mentioned otherwise, no other differences in the figure are significant at the 5% 
level. 
 
Another method to measure information aggregation produces similar results.  A chi-
squared test for goodness-of-fit can be used to test how well the observed odds or each 
InfoType is able to predict the observed winning states.  Under this test, the observed 
odds, AIA, and InfoType3 predict the winning states adequately, while InfoType1 and 
InfoType2 are both bad predictors of the winning state (p<1%). 
 
 
0%
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Figure 1:  Non-repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets predict winners better than 
most subjects, matching the few to receive three matching signals. 
 
RESULT 2. Information aggregation is occurring in the repeated increasing-price 
parimutuel market. 
The repeated increasing-price parimutuel market predicts winning states more accurately 
than 96% of subjects could with their private information alone, and closely matches the 
remaining subjects.  The reasoning is the same as used in the support for Result 1.  The 
OWP for both 1st and 2nd rounds of a repeat pair dominate the OWP of InfoType1 and 
                                                 
6 Using a Fisher-Irwin test, an exact hypergeometric test, as in Ross (1987, 232-233). 
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InfoType2 in these rounds, in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance. The data 
are shown in Figure 2. The OWP for the most likely outcome as predicted by the IAM are 
about 65% for the first round of a repeated pair and about 70% for the second round of 
the repeated power.7 The 1st round of a repeat pair performs about as well as InfoType3.  
The 2nd round of a repeat pair nearly matches InfoType3 for rank 1 (71.4% versus 72.2% 
winners), and dominates for all lower ranks.8  The 1st round of a repeat pair is dominated 
by AIA, the unattainable benchmark.  The 2nd round of a repeat pair actually performs 
better than AIA at rank 3 – all 42 winning states were ranked 1, 2, or 3 by observed odds, 
while only 41 of those states were ranked 1, 2, or 3 by the number of signals, Figure 2. 
 
Observed odds in the 1st or 2nd round of a repeat pair are a significantly better predictor 
of winners than InfoType1 or InfoType2 (p<1% for ranks 1-4, p<5% for rank 5).  AIA is 
a significantly better predictor of winners than 1st round observed odds (p<5% for ranks 
1 and 2).  No other differences are significant at the 5% level.  That is, if the prediction is 
made from the second round of a repeated pair there is no statistical difference between 
the accuracy of predictions of AIA and the odds produced by the IAM. 
 
As in the previous result, a chi-squared test for goodness-of-fit finds that the predictions 
of InfoType1 (p<1%) and InfoType2 (p<5%) poorly match the observed winning states.  
The observed odds, AIA, and InfoType3 predictions pass this test, again suggesting that 
the repeated parimutuel market is making predictions as good as the generally 
unknowable benchmark using all private information. 
 
                                                 
7 One might wonder why the OWP of about 65% for the first round of a repeated pair are 
lower than the OWP for the non repeated rounds shown in Figure 1.  The answer lies in 
the lower OWP of AIA in the first rounds of the repeated pairs, which demonstrates that 
the information to be aggregated was worse for the repeated pair rounds.  It was just the 
randomness of the draws happened to produce less information to be aggregated.  
8 In the 42 repeat pairs, the winning state had the highest observed odds in the 2nd round 
in 30 cases (30/42 = 71.4%).  Of the 18 subjects receiving three matching signals in these 
42 rounds, 13 received correct signals of the winning state (13/18 = 72.2%). 
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Figure 2:  Repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets predict winners better than most 
subjects, matching the predictive capacity of the few to receive three matching signals 
and also matching the aggregate information available. 
 
RESULT 3. Repeated and non-repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets 
perform better than previously-tested parimutuel markets. 
Both repeated and non-repeated parimutuel markets predict winning states more 
accurately than the constant-price parimutuel market tested by Plott, Wit, and Yang 
(2003).9  The OWP for non-repeated rounds, the 1st round of a repeat pair, and the 2nd 
round of a repeat pair dominate the OWP of the Plott, Wit, and Yang markets, in the 
sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance.  See Figure 3. 
 
Observed odds in the 2nd round of a repeat pair are a significantly better predictor of 
winners than PWY markets (p<5% for rank 3).  No other differences are significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Plott, Wit, and Yang consider two information environments.  Their PIC setting exactly 
matches the setting here, and only those rounds are used for comparison. 
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Figure 3:  Repeated and non-repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets predict 
winners better than markets studied by Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003). 
 
 
RESULT 4. Non-repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets exhibit a long-shot 
bias. 
Non-repeated parimutuel markets demonstrate a long-shot bias, where the observed odds 
exceed the objective winning probability for unlikely states.  This means that subjects are 
wagering too much money on unlikely events and not enough on likely events, as 
measured by the actual frequency of winners.  For this analysis we have pooled the data 
from the non-repeated sessions and the first period of the repeated sessions.  The patterns 
of these data sets are very similar but the pooling allows an increase in the sample size 
needed for statistical significance.  As reflected in the table below, the observed odds for 
the two highest-odds (and objectively most likely) states are too low (respectively 0.628 
and 0.173) as compared to actual frequencies of 0.678 and 0.20) and the odds for the 
three most unlikely states are too high (respectively 0.051,0.032, 0.021 as compared with 
0.022, 0.011, 0.000).  The result is the so called “long shot bias” in which there are 
significantly too many tickets for the 4th, 5th, and 6th state being bought, relative to the 
objective frequency of winning (p<5% one-tailed). 
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Long-Shot Bias in Non-Repeated or First of a Repeat Pair Rounds 
Rank of 
Observed 
Odds 
Average 
Observed 
Odds at rank 
Objective 
Frequency of 
winners at 
rank (OWP) 
t-statistic of 
(Odds-OWP) 
1st 0.628 0.678 (61/90) - 0.96 
2nd 0.173 0.200 (18/90) - 0.62 
3rd 0.095 0.089 (  8/90) +0.19 
4th 0.051 0.022 (  2/90) +1.82 
5th 0.032 0.011 (  1/90) +1.85 
6th 0.021 0.000 (  0/90) >1.94 
 
The pattern of bias in these rounds is consistent with that reported by Plott, Wit, and 
Yang (2003, Table 4).  They also found that there was too little betting on the two most-
likely states while the four least-likely states were over-represented. 
 
RESULT 5. Repeated increasing-price parimutuel markets do not exhibit a long-shot 
bias. 
The second round of a repeated pair of parimutuel markets does not demonstrate a long-
shot bias.  Subjects are wagering slightly too much money on the most likely event and 
not enough on mid-ranked events, relative to the objective probability of winning as 
reflected in the table below.  None of these differences are statistically significant even at 
p=10%. 
 
No Long-Shot Bias in the Second Round of a Repeat Pair 
Rank of 
Observed 
Odds 
Average 
Observed 
Odds at rank 
Objective 
Frequency of 
winners at 
rank (OWP) 
t-statistic of 
(Odds-OWP) 
1st 0.728 0.714 (30/42) +0.13 
2nd 0.148 0.167 (  7/42) - 0.32 
3rd 0.069 0.119 (  5/42) - 1.00 
4th 0.030 0.000 (  0/42) >1.26 
5th 0.017 0.000 (  0/42) >0.73 
6th 0.013 0.000 (  0/42) >0.55 
 
RESULT 6. Repeating rounds and increasing prices improve the accuracy of betting 
in the parimutuel market. 
The observed odds of the highest-rank event are higher, and the odds of other events are 
lower, in repeated parimutuel markets than in non-repeated increasing markets.  This 
same pattern holds when comparing either type of increasing-price market to Plott, Wit, 
and Yang's constant-price market.  The differences between the repeated and non-
repeated markets are statistically significant (p<1% for all except the second rank, with 
p<10%).  The repeated, increasing-price parimutuel is also a significant improvement 
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over the constant-price parimutuel (PWY), with p<1% for all states.  The non-repeated 
parimutuel is significantly better for the 1st, 2nd, and 6th rank (p<1%).10
 
Market refinements significantly improve market performance 
Rank of 
Observed 
Odds 
t-statistic of 
(2nd Round 
– 1st Round 
Odds) 
t-statistic of 
(2nd Round 
– No Repeat 
Odds) 
t-statistic of 
(2nd Round 
– PWY 
Odds) 
t-statistic of 
(No Repeat 
– PWY 
Odds) 
1st +2.15 +3.37 +5.39 +2.10 
2nd - 1.21 - 1.33 - 3.49 - 3.16 
3rd - 1.94 - 2.76 - 3.55 - 0.96 
4th - 2.75 - 4.63 - 5.82 - 1.19 
5th - 2.54 - 5.30 - 6.96 - 1.66 
6th - 1.44 - 4.02 - 6.06 - 2.04 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper picks up a challenge offered by Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003), who discovered 
that an IAM designed along the lines of parimutuel betting systems can aggregate 
information.  In spite of the success of the mechanism they studied, PWY reported 
several aspect of strategic behavior that seemed to work against any success and offered a 
challenge to design modifications for improvement.  Both theory and data call attention 
to two features.  First, within the PWY mechanism, there exists no incentive to place bets 
early.  Secondly, incentives exist to bluff and mislead.  Third, much disequilibrium 
behavior transpired that manifested itself in the final odds and thus the predictions. 
 
The research reported here studies a mechanism of increasing prices for tickets designed 
to address the first problem of delay.  The increasing prices increase the cost of delay.  A 
second feature involves a replication of the mechanism after a first round of predictions 
are known thereby attempting to remove the impact of disequilibrium decisions.  The 
results demonstrate that the two features when incorporated into a newly structured IAM 
substantially improve the prediction capability of the mechanism.  Furthermore, the 
research is able to establish a connection between the institutional feature of the IAM 
design and the particular types of biases that can exist. 
 
The principle results reside in Result 2, which claims that the IAM actually aggregates 
information.  The prediction properties do not result from the actions of a single 
knowledgeable individual.  The information contained in the odds is better than the 
information held by any single individual.  The property is seen in the fact that the 
predictions of the IAM when applied to more than just predicting one state as the winner. 
                                                 
10 Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) do not report the standard error for their estimates of 
average implicit price (observed odds) given rank.  Since their sample is slightly larger 
than ours, their errors should be smaller.  The t-stats are calculated based on the standard 
errors for the 2nd-1st and 2nd-No comparisons. 
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That is, at this task the IAM is better than the best informed of individuals and therefore 
reflects more information than is held by the best informed of the individuals.  
 
In addition to establishing the information aggregation properties of the IAM and the role 
of institutions in forming its accuracy, the results resolve a long standing debate about the 
nature of a long shot bias frequently observed in parimutuel betting systems. The long 
shot bias in the experimental parimutuel IAMs is due to disequilibrium choices and not to 
a property of psychological limitations of some sort. 
 
Although the parimutuel market does aggregate information, it does not do so perfectly.  
Even though the information aggregation is strong, mirages and bubbles still occur from 
time to time. How they might be removed and the IAM improved accordingly remains a 
challenge.  
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